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Summary findings
Talley, Giugale, and Polastri show that capital inflows  Mechanisms for prudential regulation are in place in
into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)  the region - and largely mimic the standards directed by
- inflows that are mainly private, debt-driven, and  the European Union - but the authors argue that these
increasingly supplied by banks on a shortening maturity  standards are insufficient for CEE countries. They base
- are especially vulnerable to reversals. They show that  their argument not on actual enforcement (a genuine
the region's banking systems are disproportionately  concern) but on the fact that EU banking directives were
exposed to those reversals, and absorb the lion's share of  designed for more stable economies and for banking
bank-supplied inflows.  systems less vulnerable to reversals in capital inflows.
They analyze the main links through which external  A strong case can be made, they say, for CEE countries
financial turbulence is transmitted to the domestic  to overshoot those directives, at least until the transition
banking industry, especially during the transition.  is complete.
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In the past few years, several major developing countries (including Indonesia, Korea, Mexico,
and Thailand) have suffered crises of confidence that led to sudden, large-scale reversals in the flows of
capital that those countries had been receiving.  These reversals have had serious adverse effects on, and
were in many instances accelerated by, the health of the banking systems in those economies.  As a result,
policymakers have become increasingly concerned with the link between stability in external financing
and stability in the banking sector.  This link is particularly important for Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE). 1 Banks in the region intermediate a disproportionately large part of the region's capital inflows.
In addition, the region is in the midst of completing a difficult process of transition away from central
planning and, thus, still lacks the full array of institutions necessary to underpin efficient financial sectors
(for example, well-defined property rights; transparent accounting, auditing, and reporting standards;
effective court systems; adequate collateral registration and recovery mechanisms and so on).
The literature on the link between capital inflows and banking stability is extensive.  This
literature focuses heavily on the bank lending booms that frequently accompany large-scale capital
inflows, and on the large credit losses that banks often experience as the result of these booms.  (World
Bank 1997; Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez 1996; and Sundararajan and Balifto 1991). However, the
literature on the link between capital outflows (or capital inflow reversals) and banking stability is
surprisingly scant, and virtually nonexistent with reference to CEE transitional economies.
This paper analyzes the relationship between capital inflow reversals and banking stability in
CEE countries. Following this introductory section, Section II describes the main features of the region's
observed capital inflows since the early 1990s, with special emphasis on their potential reversibility and
on the role banks have played in channeling those inflows. Section III then presents a conceptual
1. CEE countries  comprise  Albania,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  the Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  the former  Yugoslav  Republic
of Macedonia,  Poland,  Romania,  the Slovak  Republic,  and Slovenia.
1framework to highlight the linkages between reversals in capital inflows and the stability of banks, and
explains why the destabilizing effects of capital inflow reversals are likely to be particularly severe in
transitional economies.  Section IV discusses the role that prudential regulations can play in lessening
banks' vulnerability to capital inflow reversals, as well as the role that these regulations actually play in
selected CEE countries.  These regulations are also compared with the prudential regulations contained in
the European Union's  (EU) Banking Directives.  The study turns to policy in Section V and argues that
the CEE countries should adopt more stringent prudential regulatory standards than those contained in the
EU Banking Directives; and that the primary policy options are to tighten the series of regulations
designed to constrain banks' risktaking, to increase capital adequacy requirements, or both.  Some
concluding remarks close the paper (Section VI).
II. The Anatomy of Capital Inflows in Central and Eastern Europe
Although the amount of capital flowing to the CEE is still a small fraction of that entering all
developing countries, an estimated 1/15 in 1997, it has nonetheless begun to flow in at rapid rates.  Total
net flows to these countries have increased from US$1.6 billion in 1990 to $21 billion in 1997, an
increase of around 45 percent a year.  External finance has certainly provided a positive boost to CEE
countries in the transition process, facilitating transformation and enhancing welfare, especially in those
cases where domestic saving did not recover sufficiently after the initial shock of transition.  However,
capital inflows can be a double-edged sword, causing destabilizing effects such as real exchange rate
appreciation and making implementation of monetary policy difficult.  In many cases the most serious
concern is not the flows per se, but the possibility that their reversal would force these economies into a
painful and abrupt adjustment.
This section presents a description of the size and composition of capital inflows to CEE
countries, highlighting the six main elements that have characterized them since the transition began.
First, as structural reformns  have advanced, flows from official sources have declined as a share of total
2capital  flows,  and private sources  have increasingly  dominated  external  financing  in recent years. At the
early stage  of transition,  official  funding and guaranteed  capital  increased  sharply,  with bilateral  and
multilateral  sources  accounting  for most of the flows. In 1992,  once  some of the CEE countries  regained
access  to international  credit markets,  private  capital flows  begun to exceed  official  flows, and by 1996
the former  accounted  for more than 80 percent of total flows (figure 1). This type of development  is not
different  from what has been observed  in other  regions  (for example,  East Asia and Latin America),
except  that in CEE,  the speed at which  official-to-private  conversion  has taken place has been much  more
rapid.
Figure 1. CEE  Countries:  Net Capital  Flows by Source
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Source:  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance 1998.
Second, there is a strong concentration of private capital inflows in a relatively few countries.
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland-the  earlier and faster reformers among the CEE countries-
3absorbed the bulk of private capital flows entering the region, accounting for about 80 percent of private
capital flows accumulated between 1990 and 1997 (figure 2)2.






12  60  5N
0
10  50  ~
'~8  404
6  30 
4  20
2  10
0  0  0
Hungary  Czech  Rep.  Poland  Slovak  Rep.  Others
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance  1998.
Third, easily reversible capital flows (defined as short-term  debt and portfolio equity investment)
have been increasing steadily, from 7 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 1997. In addition, there are
unresolved questions about the reliability of data that distinguish direct investment from other capital
flows, and some research has shown that net foreign direct investment flows are quite volatile too
(Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer, 1994).
Fourth, debt-creating flows (lending and bonds) have been a major source of private capital.
Since 1993 these types of flows have accounted for about half of the net private flows reaching the CEE
2. A large part of those flows has been strongly related to major privatization  initiatives. Sales of government
shares  in electricity  and gas distribution,  banking  and telecommunications  in Hungary  (worth some $4.5 billion)
and a large Telecom  sale in the Czech  Republic  ($1.5  billion) provided in 1995 a onetime boost to accumulated
foreign direct investment in these countries.  As a consequence,  in  1995 the Czech Republic and Hungary
registered  record  private  capital  inflows  of 16  percent and 19.1  percent  of GDP,  respectively.
4(table l).  Moreover, despite its recent relative decline, short-term borrowing still accounts for about a
quarter of total debt-creating flows.
Table 1. CEE Countries: Size and Composition of Net Private Capital Inflows
(US$ millions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Debt-creatingflows  194  1,779  -5  6,075  5,614  11,288  8,431  11,529
Medium- and long-tenn debt  974  2,541  1,144  5,703  3,443  7,872  6,356  8,928
o/w Commercial banks  154  -901  -1,894  206  -340  4,638  4,577  4,096
Bonds 2 273  1,563  1,002  4,066  2,102  2,478  801  1,782
Short-term debt  -781  -762  -1,149  371  2,171  3,416  2,074  2,601
Non-debtcreatingflcws  450  2,246  3,056  5,637  5,567  13,681  12,026  12,464
Foreign direct investment  300  2,246  2,991  5,186  4,707  11,735  9,154  9,125
Equity investnent  150  0  65  451  861  1,946  2,873  3,339
1. Estimate
2.  1997  figure  includes  only international  bond issuance.
Source: World  Bank,  Global Development Finance  1998;  Bondware  Database,  Euromoney;  International  Monetary
Fund,  International Finance Statistics (IFS)  July 1998;  and Bank for International  Settlements  (BIS).
Fifth, a large part of the total stock of debt (around 38 percent in 1997) is owed to commercial
banks (albeit proportionately less than in East Asia-55  percent-and  Latin America-42  percent; see
table 2).  More important, the overall maturity of debt owed to commercial banks has been progressively
shortening; 40 percent of commercial bank debt now has a maturity of one year or less, compared with
about 30 percent in 1994. Judged by other regions' standards, that proportion can be expected to
continue to increase.
Finally, compared with East Asia and Latin America, a much greater proportion of the lending by
international banks is being borrowed by domestic banks in CEE countries (an average of 50 percent
during the period 1994-97, compared with 40 percent in East Asia and 25 percent in Latin America).  In
the CEE region there has also been a shift in the lending by international commercial banks toward the
private nonbank sector, while lending to the public sector has been steadily declining.
5Table 2.  CEE: Maturity, Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending
Maturity  Sectors
Position vis-A-vis  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Banks  Public sector  Nonbank
private sector
USS billions  Percentage  of total claims 2
Central and Eastern Europe
End-1994  32.1  31.1  55.6  49.6  26.7  23.4
End-1995  37.1  39.0  50.5  50.1  24.9  24.8
End-1996  44.0  40.7  47.2  48.6  19.7  31.5
End-1997  49.1  40.2  47.9  46.6  13.7  39.7
Asia
End-1996  367.0  62.3  29.7  43.3  9.0  47.6
End-1997  381.0  60.6  31.9  40.7  7.4  51.8
Latin America
End-1996  242.4  53.7  37.9  24.2  27.9  47.7
End-1997  283.0  54.8  38.6  26.0  21.2  52.6
Memorandum  item  US$ billions
Total debt stock (1997), CEE  130.9
Total debt stock (1997), Asia  665.7
Total debt stock (1997), Latin America  677.9
1. Consolidated  cross-border  claims.
2. Percentage  shares  do not total to 100  because  of unallocated  claims.
Source: BIS, Consolidated International Statistics, several  issues.
In summary, private (rather than official) capital flows have become the dominant source of
external funding for CEE countries, with those more advanced in the transition process being more
successful in mobilizing it.  The increase of private capital flows has been concentrated in a small number
of countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland.  Since 1993 "reversible" capital inflows (short-
term capital and portfolio equity flows) have been increasing rapidly.  By 1997 these types of flows
accounted for about a quarter of total net private capital inflows.  Debt-creating flows (loans and bonds)
remain the key component of the CEE's  external financing, rather than foreign direct investment or
equity investment (as observed in other developing regions).  Within those debt flows, international
commercial banks are the primary suppliers, at increasingly shorter maturities, while domestic banking
systems are the main avenue for absorbing that lending.
6IMI.  Capital Inflow Reversals, Linkages, and Banking Stability During Transition
The capital inflows  currently  accruing  to CEE  countries  are fast-growing,  mostly  private  and
debt-driven,  highly  concentrated,  primarily  intermediated  by banks,  and, critically,  increasingly
reversible. This poses  a core question:  How would the region's banking  systems  be affected  if those
capital inflows  suddenly  turned into outflows?
In general,  large-scale  capital  outflows  affect the financial  condition  of banks in a twostep
process. First, the outflows  tend  to produce  deterioration  in the macroeconomy  and result  in significant
changes  in certain  key financial  market  prices. Second,  some of these changes  in the macroeconomy  and
financial  market prices  tend to inflict  losses  on the banks-for  example,  through increased  credit losses
and a decline  in the market  value of the long-term  debt instruments  and equities  held by banks. This
section  reviews  these effects,  or linkages;  illustrates  them through actual  recent crises; and assesses  their
a priori strength  in the context of transition.
a) Effects on the .Macroeconomy and Financial Market Prices
Large-scale  capital  outflows  tend to have at least six major effects  on the macroeconomy  and
financial  market  prices. First, short of government  intervention,  capital outflows  result in a depreciation
of the domestic  c-urrency  as both foreign  investors  and domestic  entities  rush to convert  assets
denominated  in domestic  currency  into assets denominated  in foreign  currency. In many cases  the
decline  in the norninal  exchange  rate is very large  and continues  over a number  of months. For example,
in the 1994-95  Mexican  currency  crisis,  the value of the Mexican  peso fell by almost half against  the U.S.
dollar between  November  1994  and March 1995  (IMF 1998). Likewise,  as indicated  in table 3, Thailand,
Indonesia,  and Korea-the  three countries  most involved  in the recent Asia currency  crisis-have
experienced  drastic declines  in their exchange  rates.
7Table  3. Foreign  Exchange  Rates:  End of Period
(US$)
Country  June 1997  September  1997  December  1997  January 1998
Thailand'  25.79  36.52  47.25  54.92
Indonesia 2 2,450  3,275  4,650  10,375
Korea2 888  915  1,396  1,573
1/ Official  rate.
2/ Market  rate.
Source. IMF,  IFS, May 1998.
Second, capital outflows typically cause domestic interest rates to rise.  One reason is that
investors fleeing the local currency sell domestic debt instruments, thereby forcing up domestic interest
rates.  A second reason is that the central bank, in an effort to stem the deterioration of the domestic
currency, may purposely drive up interest rates in order to make the holding of domestic debt instruments
more attractive.  In the Mexican currency crisis, money market rates, which had averaged 17 percent a
year in November 1994, soared to 83 percent in March 1995, before retreating to a still extremely high
rate of 47 percent in June 1995 (IMF 1998). In the Asian currency crisis, money market rates in
Indonesia rose from an average of 12 percent a year in the first quarter of 1997 (before the crisis began)
to 41 percent in the fourth quarter, and then to 57 percent during January 1998. Money market rates in
Korea rose less drastically, but still significantly for local standards-from  an average of 12 percent in
the first quarter of 1997 to 16 percent in the fourth quarter, and then to 26 percent in January 1998 (IMF
1998).
Third, domestic equity prices typically decline during a currency crisis, often dramatically.  The
decline occurs partly because of a general loss of investor confidence and partly because interest rates on
debt instruments-an  alternative asset for investors to hold-tend  to rise.  During the Mexican crisis, the
stock market index (the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) fell from 2,591 in November 1994 to a low of 1,550
in February 1995, a decline of about 40 percent (World Bank 1995, 1996). Likewise, between July 1997
and May 1998, stock market indices fell over 40 percent in both Thailand and Indonesia, and over 50
percent in Korea (Bloomberg Financial Markets, 1998).
8Fourth, currency crises normally lead to a decline in a country's  economic growth rate.  This
decline is caused by higher interest rates, as well as an erosion in public confidence and spending that
typically accompanies capital flight.  One factor that usually acts to lessen the decline in economic
activity is an increase in exports, reflecting the improved short-term competitive position of the country
due to the depreciation of its currency.  In the Mexican currency crisis, GDP, which had risen 3.5 percent
in 1994, fell 6.2 percent in 1995. In the recent Asian crisis, Korea's estimated growth rate in 1997 was 5.5
percent, but is currently forecast to be a negative 3-4 percent in 1998. Indonesia's  growth rate is now
forecast to go from an estimated 7.0 percent in 1997 to a negative 10.0 percent in 1998, and Thailand's
from 0.5 percent to a negative 4.2 percent (J.P. Morgan 1998).
Fifth, curTency  crises often result in an increase in domestic prices, in part because of the rise in
import prices caused by the depreciation of the domestic currency.  In Mexico, the consumer price index,
which had risen at a moderate 7 percent in 1994, soared to 35 percent in 1995 (J.P. Morgan 1998). In the
Asia crisis, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea all had mid-range single digit rates of inflation in 1997 but
seem likely to have inflation rates well into the double digits in 1998.3
Sixth, it is common for a currency crisis to result in a decline (often sharp) in real estate prices.
This decline reflects both the fall in the level of economic activity and the rise in interest rates that
typically accompany a currency crisis.
b) Effects on the iFinancial Conditions of Banks
The macroeconomic and financial market effects discussed above can have several harmful
effects on the financial condition of the banking system. This point is best illustrated by reference to the
serious adverse effects that the Mexican currency crisis of 1994-95 had on the Mexican banking system. 4
3. For example,  J. P. Morgan  has forecast  Thailand's inflation  rate for 1998  at 15 percent,  Indonesia's  at 60 percent,
and Korea's at 12.5  percent  (J. .P. Morgan  1998).
4. Material  for these  illustrations  is derived  from Sachs,  Tomell,  and Velasco  (1996); Truman  (1996);  and intemal
World  Bank  documents.
9First, it is highly  probable  that banks  will experience  a decline  in the quality  of their loan  portfolios. This
deterioration  results from a general slowdown  in the economy,  a rise in interest  rates that increases  the
debt-servicing  burden of borrowers,  and the depreciation  of the domestic  currency  that increases
borrowers' import  costs,  as well as the debt-servicing  burden  of borrowers  who have debt  denominated  in
foreign  currency. In the Mexican  crisis, banks had a relatively  high level of problem loans  even before
the crisis began,  in part reflecting  unduly  rapid growth  in their loan  portfolios  that far exceeded  the
growth  of the economy. The  peso crisis exacerbated  this situation,  increasing  the level of problem loans
by 30 percent during  the first two months  of the crisis.
Banks  also tend to experience  a decline in the value of their investment  portfolios. The rise in
interest rates  causes a decline  in the value of banks' debt securities,  with the amount of the decline
depending  on the maturity  of these securities. The decline  in equity  prices,  which is often large during a
crisis of confidence,  also produces  losses  for banks.  In the case of Mexico,  banks initially  held equity
investments  that amounted  to about  27 percent  of their equity capital. Given  this exposure,  the 40 percent
decline  in Mexican  equity prices  during  the crisis eroded  about 10  percent of the banks' capital.
The  rise in interest  rates can either increase  or decrease  banks' net interest  margin, depending  on
the repricing  intervals  of their assets relative  to their liabilities. If the average  repricing  interval  of assets
exceeds  the average  repricing  interval  of liabilities,  the banks would suffer  shrinkage  in their net interest
margin.
Depreciation  of the domestic  currency  can result in either foreign  currency  gains or losses,
depending  on the initial foreign  currency  position  of the banks. If a bank had foreign  currency  liabilities
that exceeded  its foreign  currency  assets  (and this open position  was not fully  hedged  by forward
contracts),  the bank would suffer a foreign currency  loss.  In the case of Mexico,  the depreciation  of the
peso resulted  in sizable  foreign  currency  losses,  amounting  to more than 10  percent of the banks' capital.
The reason is that Mexican  banks  were relying  heavily on foreign-currency-denominated  deposits  to fund
their operations. In October  1994,  dollar-denominated  bank deposits  accounted  for about a quarter of the
10banking  system's total deposits. It is interesting  that, shortly  after the crisis began,  Mexican  banks
switched  to a net long foreign  currency  position,  thereby  positioning  themselves  to benefit from any
further  depreciation  of the peso.
The fall in real estate prices that typically  accompanies  a currency  crisis  tends to adversely  affect
banks in two ways. First, most banks make sizable  amounts  of mortgage  loans,  and the decline  in real
estate prices  reduces  the value of the collateral  supporting  these loans. Second,  banks frequently  own a
certain  amount  of real estate consisting  of the bank's headquarters  building  and any branch  offices  that
the bank may  have.
Finally,  it is possible  that banks  might experience  significant  liquidity  pressures,  particularly  if
they incur  sizeable  losses from some of the factors  discussed  above. This was  the case in Mexico,  where
banks lacked alternative  sources  of funding  to replace  maturing foreign-currency-denominated  deposits,  a
significant  portion  of which were not renewed. Even  when funding  sources  could  be found,  the banks
had to pay a significantly  higher risk premium  than  they had paid in the period  before  the crisis.
c) The Linkages of Reversals in the Context of Transition
Many  of the effects  of capital inflow  reversals  described  above  could be considerably  amplified
in the CEE  transitional  economies,  both at the macroeconomic  and at the banking  sector  levels. First, as
indicated  in Section  II, a disproportionately  large  part of the region's capital inflows  are "easily
reversible"  and are intermediated  by banks.
Second,  key market-supporting  institutions  are not yet fully developed  in the CEE countries.
Four such institutions  are particularly  important  in terms  of banking  sector  vulnerability  to external
shocks:
*  Inadequate accounting and auditing.  This deficiency makes it difficult for investors to
properly  evaluate  enterprises  and banks. In the absence  of information  in which  they can
have a high level of confidence,  investors  are apt to assume  the worst during a crisis.
11*  Deficient legal frameworks.  Reflecting their relatively recent emergence from central
planning, CEE countries still exhibit significant shortcomings in the legal infrastructure that
supports the banking industry, especially in terms of property rights protection, company law,
contract law, bankruptcy law, and collateral law and registration (Gray 1993 and Dittus
1994). The effect of these shortcomings is compounded by weak judicial  institutions and
processes that frequently result in long delays in settling court actions.  In aggregate, these
deficiencies make doing business in CEE countries significantly more risky than in more
mature market economies.
*  Poor corporate governance.  CEE countries do not have fully developed tools and
procedures to ensure that there are adequate "checks and balances" on enterprise and bank
management, and that managers consistently seek to maximize company equity value, or
even follow applicable laws in their decision-making process (Frydman, Gray and
Rapaczynski 1996; and Phelps and others 1993). This naturally tends to erode investor
confidence, particularly in a period of crisis.
*  Weak bank supervision.  The supervision and regulation of banks is a relatively new activity
for governments in the CEE countries.  Consequently, although significant progress has been
made in recent years, these countries still lag well behind developed countries in such areas
as bank examination, offsite surveillance and effective enforcement actions  (Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal 1996). Investors are aware of these weaknesses and tend to view banks as
more risky than they would if strong supervision and regulation were in place.
IV. The Role of Prudential Regulation: Theory and Practice in CEE Countries
External financing positions that are highly vulnerable to capital inflow reversals and market-
supporting institutions that are still in the making render the prudential regulation of banks of critical
importance for policymakers in CEE countries.  This section assesses the main prudential regulations
12currently in force in those countries and compares them with parallel regulations in the EU's Banking
Directives (table 4).5 Our emphasis is on those key prudential regulations that are designed to limit
banks ' risktaking, and on bank capital adequacy provisions that are designed to ensure that banks
maintain an adequate "cushion" against possible losses.  The prudential regulations discussed in this
section constitute only part of the full range of public policies and procedures for effectively regulating
and supervising a banking system. 6 Moreover, the discussion in this section does not attempt to evaluate
how well the CEIE  countries are actually enforcing their prudential regulations (an otherwise important,
country-specific tndertaking).7
a) Limitations on Credit Risk Exposures
Of all of the risks that banks face, the one that is probably most responsible for banking distress
and bank failures is credit risk.  One way that governments attempt to constrain credit risk is to prevent
undue credit concentrations.  First, policymakers typically limit a bank's  credit and off-balance-sheet
exposures to any single party (and entities that are related to that single party) to some specified
percentage of the bank's capital.  As indicated in table 4, all of the CEE countries in our sample have
single exposure limits.  There is some variation in the limits, but the most common is 25 percent of a
bank's capital, which parallels the EU limit.
Governments also try to constrain credit risk by placing a limit (as a percent of capital) on a
bank's exposures to connected parties ("insiders").  This limitation recognizes that such exposures
involve "non-arm s-length" transactions that are subject to conflict of interest.  Connected parties usually
include a bank's  ]arge shareholders, its directors and senior managers, and those entities and persons that
5. The EU's Banking  Directives  have been  selected  for comparison  because,  as part of their quest to  join the EU, the
CEE  countries  have  tended to align their bank regulatory  systems  to those directives.
6. Policies not addressed in this paper include bank licensing requirements,  bank examinations  and reporting,
supervisory  enforcement  actions,  transparent  bank accounting,  lender  of last resort, prompt  closure  procedures,
bank restructuring,  and deposit  insurance. For further  reading  on these, see Borish,  Ding, and  Noel (1996).
7. For a general  review  of the prudential  regulation  and supervision  of banks,  see Polizatto  in Vittas  (1992).
13Table 4. EU and CEE countries: Main Banking Prudential Regulations
Open foreign
Maximum single  Connected  Aggregate large  exchange  Investment in
EU or country  exposure  exposure limit  exposure limit  exposure limit  enterprises limit  Capital adequacy
EU  25% of capital  20% of capital  for  800%  of capital  No standard  15%  of capital in  Minimum  of 8% of
exposures  to parent  single firm;  60% for  risk-weighted
company  and  firms in aggregate  exposures
subsidiaries
Czech Republic  25% of capital  to  20% of capital  800%  of capital  15%  of capital  20% of capital  Minimum  of 8% of
nonbanks;  125%  of  risk-weighted
capital  for banks  in  exposures
country  or OECD
Hungary  25% of capital  to  15%  of adjusted  800%  of adjusted  Net foreign  15%  of adjusted  Minimum  of 8% of
one party or group  capital  capital  exchange  liability  capital  for single  risk-weighted
of related  parties  limited  to 30% of  nonbank  enterprise  exposures




Slovak Republic  25% of capital  for  25% of capital  800%  of capital  Total  net of foreign  25% of capital for  Minimum  of 8% of
nonbanks;  80%  for  exchange  liability  of  non-banks  risk-weighted
banks  25% of capital;  7-  exposures
10%  limits  on
individual
currencies
Poland  10%  of capital  for a  15%  of capital  Informally  expected  Aggregate  oneway  25% of capital in  Minimum  of 8% of
single  entity and  not to exceed  800%  exposure  of 40% of  single group  of non-  risk-weighted
15%  for a  of capital  capital;  net  financial  entitites,  exposures;  higher
connected  group  exposure  of 30% of  but 50% with  for new banks
capital;  maximum  approval  of
open exposure  in  supervisor
one currency  of
15%  capital
Slovenia  25% of capital;  an  5%  of capital,  and  800%  of capital  As prescribed  by  100%  of capital  for  Minimum  of 8% of
exposure  of 10%  exposures  require  supervisor  land,  buildings,  risk-weighted
requires  approval  by  consent  of all  business  equity,  and  exposures
Supervisory  members  of  shares  of non-
Council  Supervisory  financial
Council  organizations
Source:  EU Banking  Directives;  national  central  banks.are related  to these insiders. Limits are frequently  placed on both a bank's exposure  to any single
connected  party and on its aggregate  exposures  to all connected  parties. In addition, some  countries
require  that all connected-party  transactions  be carried out on market terms. As indicated  in Table 4,
there is considerable  variation  in the manner  in which the CEE countries  deal with connected  exposures.
Slovenia  places  a limit on single  connected  exposures  at 5 percent of a bank's capital,  while  the Slovak
Republic  sets the limit  at 25 percent  of capital. The  EU has a 20 percent  limit on a bank's exposure  to
any parent company  and subsidiaries  of this parent.
Finally:,  to promote  the diversification  of bank loan portfolios,  many  governments  place a limit on
a bank's aggregate  large  exposures. A large exposure  is usually  defined  as any exposure  that exceeds 10
percent  of a bank's capital. The EU Banking  Directives  set a limit on a bank's aggregate  large exposures
at eight times the bank's capital. This 800  percent limitation  has been followed  by all of the CEE
countries,  although  Poland's limitation  is advisory  in nature.
b) Limitations on Foreign Exchange Risk Exposures
Many banks in developing  countries  take positions  in foreign currency-mostly in connection
with  providing  deposit  and lending  services  to their customers,  but also from participating  in foreign
currency  trading. In undertaking  these transactions,  banks encounter  potential  foreign  exchange  risk-
the risk of loss owing  to changes  in the value of foreign  currencies  relative  to the domestic  currency. The
most widely used measure  of a bank's foreign  currency  exposure  is its open position-that  is, the amount
that the bank's foreign-currency-denominated  assets  and asset-like  off-balance-sheet  commitments
differs  from its foreign  currency-denominated  liabilities  and liability-like  off-balance-sheet  commitments.
If the bank has more  of the former  than the latter,  the bank is said to have a "long" position. In the
opposite  case,  the bank is said to have a "short"  position.
To constrain  the foreign  currency  risk of banks,  many governments  impose  limits on the amount
of a bank's open position  in any single  foreign  currency  and the amount  of the bank's net aggregate  open
15position (where long positions in one foreign currency are offset against a short position in another
currency).  These limitations on open positions typically are expressed as a percentage of a bank's
capital.  The more volatile a country's foreign exchange rate, the more restrictive the limitation should be.
Consequently, limitations on open positions should generally be more restrictive in developing countries
than in industrial countries, which tend to have more stable exchange rates.
As indicated in table 4, there is significant variation in the foreign currency restrictions among
the CEE countries, both with respect to the form and level of the limitation.  For example, the Czech
Republic places a limit of 15 percent of capital on a bank's total net open foreign exchange position (and
also limits total net open positions in nonconvertible currencies to 4 percent of a bank's  capital).  By
contrast, the Slovak Republic places a limit of 25 percent of capital on a bank's total net foreign exchange
position.
To monitor compliance with banks' open foreign currency positions, the supervisory authorities
require banks to submit periodic reports.  In the Czech Republic, banks are required to report their open
positions on a daily basis.  In Poland, banks submit reports on their open foreign currency positions in
individual currencies every month and on their aggregate open position every ten days (Group of Banking
Supervisors from the Central and Eastern European Countries 1995).
c) Limitations on Interest Rate Risk Exposures
Banks assume interest rate risk when they have gaps in the repricing intervals of their assets and
liabilities. For example, if a bank within the next 90 days has more liabilities than assets that will be
repriced (either because they will mature or have a variable rate), and if interest rates rise, the bank would
suffer a decline in its net interest margin and earnings.  In extreme cases, where banks have very large
gaps in their asset and liability repricing intervals and interest rates move sharply in the "wrong"
direction, banks can be driven into insolvency.
16To monitor banks' exposure to interest rate risk, many bank supervisors require periodic "gap
reports" from the banks.  These reports show the amount of a bank's  assets and liabilities that will be
repriced within various future time intervals-for  example, within 30 days, from 30 to 90 days, from 90
to 180 days, and so forth.  On the basis of these reports, supervisors can form judgments about the degree
of interest rate risk exposure that a bank is assuming and, where necessary, can call for or take corrective
actions ranging from the use of moral suasion to "cease and desist" actions.  The supervision of interest
rate risk, however, is essentially qualitative and judgmental in nature, both in the CEE and elsewhere, and
includes consideration of the likelihood of sizable changes in the level of interest rates or sharp shifts in
the shape of the yield curve.
d) Limitations on Market-Risk Exposures
Market risk relates to a potential decline in the value of a bank's  investments and trading account
securities as the result of a decline in market prices.  For instance, debt securities are vulnerable to a rise
in interest rates.,  with the degree of vulnerability a function of the maturity of the debt.  Equities are
vulnerable to a general decline in equity prices or developments that adversely affect the specific shares
held by the ban k.
Governments tend to view the equity holdings of banks as particularly risky.  Thus, most
policymakers place tight limits on a bank's  equity holdings, either through provisions in the banking law
or through prudential regulations.  These limitations are usually expressed as a percentage of the bank's
capital. A few countries, such as the United States, go even further and essentially prohibit banks from
holding equities of nonfinancial companies.  In addition to concern about market risk, some governments
also seek to maintain a clear separation between banking and commerce in the economy.  Table 4
contains a list of current limitations placed on banks' equity holdings in selected CEE countries.  As
indicated, there is significant variation among these countries both in the form and the level of the
limitations, and most them have somewhat more restrictive provisions than those contained in the EU
17Banking Directives.  Hungary, however, appears to be less restrictive, allowing a bank to hold equities in
an amount up to 100 percent of its capital (compared with 60 percent in the EU Directives).
Governments typically do not place specific quantitative limitations on the amount of a bank's
debt securities.  However, supervisors do monitor a bank's debt security holdings and are usually
prepared to take supervisory action in those cases where the bank takes excessive market risk.  Moreover,
where debt securities are actively traded and have reliable market prices, supervisors frequently require
banks to carry certain securities at market value, rather than historical cost.  This procedure creates an
incentive for banks to manage their debt security portfolios more prudently than otherwise might be the
case.
e) Limitations on Liquidity-Risk Exposures
Liquidity risk relates to the potential inability of banks to honor their contractual obligations on
time.  The most common form of illiquidity is the inability to meet deposit withdrawals or maturing debt
obligations.  Liquidity is probably the most difficult type of bank risk for governments to regulate.  In
normal times, most banks have large cash inflows from new deposits, interest payments on loans and
investments, and maturing short-term loans. Consequently, illiquidity is not a major threat.  When
illiquidity becomes a threat is during a crisis-either  for a specific bank or the entire banking system.
Since policymakers typically have little ability to forecast the occurrence or the extent of a
liquidity crisis, they usually do not employ quantitative limitations to constrain banks'  liquidity risk
(except perhaps for limiting the amount of funding that a bank can obtain from any single funding
source). Instead, supervisors monitor the liquidity position of banks and take action when banks clearly
have an excessive concentration of funding sources or inadequate liquid assets to meet their liquidity
needs during a period of stress.  In Poland, for example, the central bank collects and analyzes monthly
returns that banks are required to submit in a standardized form.  These forms provide information on
18short-, medium- and long-term liquidity in domestic, convertible and non-convertible currencies and
include maturity dates for both balance sheet and off-balance-sheet items.
f) Capital Adequacy Requirements
The basic purpose of capital is to serve as a cushion-that  is, to allow banks to absorb losses and
remain solvent and in operation.  The primary problem that governments face in regulating bank capital is
judging the potential size of future bank losses.
In July 1988, the Basle Committee, which includes bank supervisory representatives from the
major industrial countries, developed the so-called Basle Capital Accord (Basle Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices 1988). This accord set forth a procedure for determining the
amount of capital that individual banks should possess.  According to the Basle standard, a bank should
have total capital of at least 8 percent of its risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet exposures. 8 In
calculating the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio, the bank's  assets and off-balance-sheet items
are divided into various risk categories and assigned risk-weighted coefficients that range from zero to
1O0  percent (with zero assigned to riskless exposures).
The Basle capital standards are now used by all EU members, as well as by some 80 other
countries throughout the world.  Although the original Basle approach was designed to capture only
credit risk and off-balance-sheet risk, it has since been modified to incorporate market risk.  Moreover, it
is likely that other forms of bank risk will be incorporated in the standard in future years.
As shown in table 4, all of the selected CEE countries have adopted the basic Basle framework
and have set the minimum capital standard at 8 percent. In the early 1990s, several CEE countries
temporarily set the percentage somewhat lower because many (or most) of their banks were significantly
8. Total capital  unde:r  the Basle standard  consists  of Tier I and Tier II capital. Tier I capital includes  such items  as
paid-up  common  stock,  noncumulative  preferred  stock,  and retained  earnings. Tier I capital is the highest  quality
of capital and should amount  to at least 50 percent of total capital. Tier II capital includes  such items  as general
loan  loss reserves,  subordinated  terrn  debt, and conservatively  valued  revaluation  reserves.
19below the 8 percent level. However, these banks were put on alert that 8 percent would become the
standard in the medium term. 9
V.  Adjusting Regulation to Minimize Banking Vulnerability in Central and Eastern Europe
There are two preeminent policy issues relating to the prudential regulations now in effect in the
CEE countries.  Are these regulations, which largely parallel (and in some cases are essentially the same
as) those contained in the EU Banking Directives, appropriate to minimize banking vulnerability, in
particular vis-a-vis capital inflow reversals?  If not appropriate, how should these regulations be
tightened?
a) The Case  for  Tighter Prudential Regulations
There is a compelling case for the CEE countries to have tighter prudential regulations than those
contained in the EU Banking Directives.  First, CEE banks are far more vulnerable to endogenous and
exogenous shocks than banks in those Western European countries that are governed (and originally
targeted) by the EU Banking Directives.  In Section II, this paper focused particular attention on one form
of exogenous shock-potential  capital inflow reversals-and  has concluded that the CEE countries are
disproportionately vulnerable, even compared with other emerging market regions. But the CEE
countries are also exposed to other (and possibly even more serious) potential shocks, such as
macroeconomic instability.  Further, these countries understandably are far less experienced than the
Western European countries in developing effective policies to minimize the adverse effects of shocks to
the economy and the banking and financial sectors.
Second, as discussed in Section III, key institutional frameworks are not yet fully developed in
the CEE countries, and this has heightened banking risk.  These factors include inadequate accounting
9.  The Czech  Republic  initially  mandated  that banks reach a minimum  capital ratio of 6.25 percent by year-end
1993,  and then the target ratio of 8 percent by year-end 1996. In the Slovak Republic,  banks were initially
required  to achieve  a minimum  ratio of 6.75 percent by year-end  1994,  7.25  percent by year-end 1995,  and 8
percent  by year-end  1996.
20and auditing, deficiencies in the legal framework, shortcomings in corporate governance, and relatively
inexperienced bank management and bank supervisors. 10 These deficiencies are likely to be particularly
damaging during a crisis by contributing to greater uncertainty and pessimism among market participants.
As noted earlier, deficiencies in accounting and auditing are likely to result in market participants
assuming the worst during a crisis.
Finally, and most important, there is persuasive empirical evidence indicating that the banking
systems in the CEE countries have been highly unstable during the transition to a market economy,
clearly much more unstable than their EU counterparts.  Box 1 summarizes information from Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal (1996) that vividly documents the serious banking problems experienced by the CEE
countries in recent years.  As evidence that these problems have been endemic to transitional economies
in general, box 2 presents similar information for the forner  Soviet Union.
Box 1. Recent  Banking  Problems  in Selected  CEE  Countries
Bulgaria  (1991-present).  About  75 percent  of non-government  loans  were nonperforming  in 1995,  leaving  many
banks  insolvent.  Runs  on banks  have been  reflected  in pressure  on reserve  money  and a queue  of unsettled  interbank
payments.
Czech  Rpu  99J-presenK  In 1993-94,  38 percent  of bank loans  were nonperforming.  Three  small  banks  were
closedin  0193-4 one failed  iin  195,  and another  in 1996.
Hungary  (1987-present).  Eight  banks  accounting  for 25 percent  of financial  system  assets  became  insolvent.  At the
end  of  19  3 percent  of total  loans  were  probleatic.  There  have  ben two depostor runs.
Poland  (1991-present).  Sixteen  perent of loans  were classified  as losses,  22 percent  as doubtful,  and 24 percent  as
Romania  (1990-present).  Five  major  state-owned  banks  had 35 percent  of their accrued  interest  overdue  as of June
30, 1994.
Slovak  Repulic (1991.95). Loans  classified  as nonstandard  were high at the end of August 1995.  There  were no
runs or major  bank clsures, but ail five majorW  state banks  required  government-sponsored  restructuring  operations.
Slovena :(1992-94).  Three banks,  withvtwo  thirds  of the banking  system's  assets,  were restructured  during  this
period.  Thepercentage  of bad  loansV  is not known.  Bank rehabilitation  was completed  in 1995.
Source:  Lindgren,  Carl-Johan,  Gillian  Garcia  and Matthew  1. Saal. 1996,  Bank  Soundness  and Macroeconomic
Policy International  Monetary  Fund.
10.  In general, the entry of foreign banks into individual  CEE countries has tended to reduce some
shortcomings  by introducing  "good  bank standards"  into these  countries.
21Based on the evidence above, it appears inappropriate to employ prudential regulations that have
been designed for the relatively stable, mature banking systems of Western Europe to the relatively
unstable, immature banking systems of the CEE countries. Although the need for tighter prudential
regulations in CEE countries seems clear, however, it is not clear to what extent these regulations should
Box 2. Recent  Banking Problems in Selected  Countries of the Former  Soviet  Union
Armenia  (1994-present).  The central  bank has closed  half of the active banks  since  August 1994,  but  the
nonperforming  asset problem  of the large  banks  remains  to be tackled.  lThe  Savings  Bank has negligible  capital.
Azerbajian  (1995-present).  One large  state-owned  bank is facing  a serious  liquidity  problem,  and new management
has been  appointed. Twelve  private  banks have  been  closed  owing  to noncompliance  with  regulations;  three large
state-owned  banks  will be insolvent  if loan losses  are written  off.
Belarus  (1995-present).  Many  banks  are undercapitalized;  forced  mergers  have burdened  some banks  with  poor
loan  portfolios,  the regulatory  environment  is uncertin.
Estonia  (1992-95).  Insolvent  banks  held 41 percet  of banking systemn  assets. The licenses  of five banks  (one
large)  have  been revoked,  two  major  banks  were merged  and  nationalized,  and two large  banks  were merged  and
converted  to a loan  recovery  agency.
Georgia  (1991-present).  About  a third  of banks' outstanding  loans  are hoiperfonming.  Most  large  banks  would  be
insolvent  if adequate  provisions  were made  for all nonperforming  loans.
Kazakhstan  (1991-95). Forty  percent  of assets  are to be written  off; 80 percent  of banks  would  be insolvent  if all
bad loans were  written  off.
Kyrgyz  Republic  (ongoing). Eighty  to 90 percent  of all loans are doubtful. Four small  commercial  banks  were
closed,  and two  large state banks  are facing  problems.
Latvia (1995-present). Two-thirds  of audited  banks  recorded  losses  in 1994.  Eight bank licenses  were revoked  in
1994  and 15  more  were revoked  during  the first seven  months of 1995. The subsequent  closure  of the largest  bank
(with 30 percent  of deposits)  and two  other  major  banks  triggered  a banking  crisis in  the spring  of 1995.
Lithuania  (1995-present).  Of 25 banks, 12 small  ones art being liquidated,  and four larger  ones did not meet the
capital  adequacy  requirements.  The fourth-largest  bank was closed. The operations  of two  banks,  which  accounted
for 15  percent  of deposits,  were supported  in 1995. There were large-scale  deposit  withdrawals  at the end of 1995
and the beginning  of 19%. A  i  plan is under  implementation.
Russia  (199-present). Over  2,500 banks  have been  established  since 1992. n 1994, 110  banks  were closed,  and 96
were closed  in the first eight  monihs  of 1995.  Official  estimates  of loan arrears  were 40 percent  of total  credit  to the
private  sector  at the end of 1995.
Tajikistan  (ongoing). One of the largest  banks  is insolvent One small  bank has  been closed,  and another  (out of
17)  is in the process  of liquidation.
Ukraine  (1994-present).  In 1994,  many banks  did not meet  capital and  other  prudential  regulations.  Audits
indicated  that  one of the five largest  banks  was insolvent. Approximately  30 percent  of loans outstanding  were in
arrears. 'the authorities  intervened  in 20 small-  and mediunm-sized  banks  in 1995.
Uzbekistan  (1993-present).  Almost 10  percent  of loans were reported  to be overdue  in October 1995.
Source:  Lindgren,  Carl-Johan,  Gillian  Garcia  and Matthew  I. Saal. 1996.  Bank  Soundness  and Macroeconomic
Policy. International  Monetary  Fund. Washington,  D.C
22be tightened. It is probable  that the right amount  of regulatory  tightening  would  vary among  CEE
countries,  depending  on their exposure  to endogenous  and exogenous  shocks  and on the progress  that
each country  has made in developing  banking  and supervisory  skills and an effective  legal and
institutional  framework  for operating  the banking  system. For some (or even all) of the CEE  countries,
the amount  of needed  regulatory  tightening  may, however,  be quite sizable. If so, it would  probably  be
necessary  to phase in the tighter regulations  over time (say several  years) in order to avoid  undue
dislocations  in the banking  and financial  systems,  and a contraction  of the economy. There are numerous
precedents  for giving  banking  systems  time to adjust  to tighter regulations,  including  the implementation
throughout  the EU of the Basle  capital adequacy  guidelines  in the late 1980s.
It is reasonable  to assume  that over time the CEE countries  and their banking  systems  will
become  more stable. If and when  this occurs,  the tighter prudential  regulations  could  be eased  somewhat,
with the goal  of eventually  bringing  these regulations  into  full alignment  with those in the EU Banking
Directives.
b) The  Form of Tighter  Prudential  Regulations
If CEE  countries  are to be subjected  to tighter prudential  regulations  than those applying  to
Western  European  countries,  what form should  this tightening  take? Should  it involve  higher  capital
adequacy  requirements,  tougher  prudential  regulations  designed  to constrain  specific  types of banks'
risktaking  (such as credit risk), or both?
Three main considerations  should  weigh in the answer  to those questions. First, what factors
appear  to be the primary  causes of banking  instability  in each country? If the major causes  are insider
lending,  credit concentrations,  and foreign  exchange  losses,  then a good case could  be made for
tightening ihe  limits on insider  lending,  single  exposures,  aggregate  large exposures  and open foreign
currency  positions. In contrast,  if the causes of banking  problems  appear  to be more general  and
23dispersed, as is the case when capital inflow reversals occur, the best policy might be to increase capital
adequacy requirements, thereby forcing banks to have greater "cushions" to absorb all types of losses. "
Second, policymakers should identify and carefully evaluate the economic and financial market
effects of alternative forms of regulatory tightening.  For instance, although raising capital adequacy
requirements would strengthen the banking system, it would also lead to reduced financial intermediation
and higher prices for that system's services.  Similarly, tightening existing limits on connected lending,
single exposures, and aggregate large exposures would tend to reduce bank credit risk, but this policy
could also result in some creditworthy borrowers losing access to credit.  Yet, tightening these limits
could have the effect of promoting the development of syndicated lending and of improving allocative
efficiency by forcing more bank transactions into the marketplace where they would have to pass an
"arms-length" test-both  desirable effects for CEE economies in transition.
Third, most (or all) of the CEE countries seek to accede to the EU.  In doing so, these countries
will have to conform to the many rules and institutional arrangements required of all EU members-
including those contained in the Banking Directives.  Therefore, any policy actions to tighten prudential
regulations should take into consideration the implications for attaining EU membership.  In some cases,
tightening prudential regulations may not be a problem.  For example, the Banking Directives specify that
all member countries must require their banks to maintain capital of at least 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets, but also provide that members have the flexibility to set higher capital requirements, if deemed
desirable.
I1.  In a number  of Latin American  countries,  the supervisory  authorities  have set minimum  capital  to risk-weighted
assets requirements  that are higher than the 8 percent Basle minimum  in recognition of the more volatile
environment  in these countries. For example, the requirement is 11.5 percent in Argentina,  9 percent in
Ecuador,  and  11  percent in Peru.  Moreover,  the present 10 percent requirement  in Brazil will be increased  to
11 percent  in November  1998.
24VI.  Conclusions
This paper has shown  that the structure  of capital inflows  into  CEE countries  is particularly
vulnerable  to reversals  (predominantly  private, debt-driven,  and increasingly  supplied  by banks on a
shortening  maturity). It has also shown  that the region's banking  systems  are disproportionately  exposed
to those reversals  (they  absorb the lion's share of the bank-supplied  inflows). The main linkages  for
transmission  of external  financial  turbulence  to the domestic  banking  industry  were analyzed,  and the
particular  strength  of those linkages  was assessed  in the context  of transition.
Although  mechanisms  for prudential  regulation  are in place in the region,  and by and large  mimic
the standards  directed  by the EU, this paper  has argued  that such standards  are insufficient  for CEE
countries. The argument  was made not on the basis of weaknesses  in actual  enforcement  (a genuine
concern  whose  elaboration  would call for separate,  country-specific  studies)  but on the basis that the EU
Banking  Directives  have been designed  for economies  that are much more  stable and for banking  systems
that are much  less vulnerable  to capital  inflow  reversals. A strong  case exists for CEE countries  to
overshoot  those directives,  at least until the transition process  is completed.
Much like the bank supervision  function  itself, the suggestion  for further  regulatory  tightening  in
CEE countries' banking  sectors  is based on qualitative  judgment rather  than quantitative  certainty.
Moreover,  the irnplementation  of that additional  regulatory  tightening,  in itself,  raises important  policy
issues  that can be dealt with only at the individual  country  level (e.g.,  the likelihood  of different  types of
external  and internal  shocks;  the welfare cost of reduced  financial  intermediation;  and the like). This
highlights  the need  for theoretical  modeling  of optimal  bank regulation  burdens in varying  economy-wide
scenarios-an area of promise  for further  research,  especially  in the context  of volatility-prone  CEE
economies  in transition.
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